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FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION: 
A REASONED APPROACH 
Earl Snyder* 
THE main purpose in protecting private foreign in:7estme1:t is to encourage capital to move to newly developmg nations 
in spite of serious, existing non-business risks. These risks are 
(1) the political risk (outright and "creeping" expropriation), 
(2) the transfer risk ( currency controls and inconvertibility of 
funds), and (3) the calamity risk (insurrection, revolution, war, 
etc.). But why encourage this?1 Why should an affluent, powerful 
nation seek, in effect, to transport overseas some of its affluence 
and power? Why-in the case of the United States-should en-
couragement be given to that which may, according to some, 
tend to tip still more unfavorably the balance of payments? 
There are two reasons: humanitarianism and self-interest. 
The humanitarian reasons are these: first, there is a moral 
challenge. Industrially developed nations cannot go their way 
oblivious of the fact that millions of people in other nations are 
hungry, ill-clothed and ill-housed.2 Second, there is an appalling 
gap between the standard of living of the industrially developed 
nations (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the 
countries of northwestern and west central Europe) and the newly 
developing nations. Approximately two-thirds of the people of the 
world live at or below a subsistence level.3 Third, if the capitalist-
democratic ideals of relative political freedom and human dignity 
do not take root in newly developing nations, these desirable hu-
man values will almost certainly disappear from civilization.4 
The self-interest reasons are these: first, progress of indus-
trially developed nations will not continue if a significant portion 
• Member of the District of Columbia Bar; Barrister-at-Law, Gray's Inn, London.-Ed. 
1 For the view that private foreign investment should not be encouraged presently 
because of world conditions, see Drucker's comment in THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTEC· 
TION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, INT'L & COMP. L.Q. SUPP. PUB. No. 3, at 
15-17 (1962): "It appears to me that encouragement and protection of investment in the 
developing countries arc, at present, two contradictory aims, one excluding the other. 
Since no long-term investment in a developing country can-in present circumstances--
be effectively protected, a call for an increase of such investments should, with few 
exceptions, be disregarded for the time being." Id. at 15. 
2 Address by Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, ·wayne State University Conference on the Prospects for Democracy in the 
Underdeveloped Areas, Detroit, Mich., May 1, 1959. 
3 STALEY, THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 13-17 (rev. ed. 1961). Basing 
his calculations on United Nations' documents, Staley indicates that the average per 
capita income of these people is less than $150. Id. at 17. 
4 Id. at 3. 
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of the world remains stagnant. Industrially developed nations need 
raw materials as well as markets for their manufactured goods and 
other products.5 Moreover, experience indicates that they acquire 
lasting markets in nations they have helped to develop. Second, 
ill-clothed, hungry, ill-housed people are discontented and rest-
less. They not infrequently resort to insurrection and armed rev-
olution. A large, long-term, economically unproductive arms ex-
penditure to provide "police protection" is more expensive than 
aiding underdeveloped nations to industrialize. Third, there is a 
"specific challenge of communism." Communist ideology seeks, 
of course, to develop underdeveloped nations in its image. If the 
communists are successful in accomplishing this, the human values 
of western civilization will doubtless be crushed.6 Fourth, non-
communist nations are aided in keeping united and strong by 
foreign trade ties. Indeed, one reason for the failure of the com-
munist bloc to draw some newly developing nations into its orbit 
has been the not insignificant trade of these nations with indus-
trially developed western nations.7 
But one should be clear on two points: first, private capital 
moves because it believes it can make a profit. If there is not 
sufficient profit potential, private capital will not go abroad-no 
matter how well protected it may be when it gets there-unless, 
of course, there is strong governmental encouragement. (This 
usually involves assurance of reasonable profit initially-along 
with, perhaps, subtle exhortation to patriotism-and an independ-
ent business judgment that a profitable venture will ultimately 
exist in its own right.) Specifically, private investment will not 
normally go abroad unless there are (1) ample market prospects (in-
cluding the prospect of protecting a market already supplied from 
another base, or the more economical supplying of a market in a 
nearby country); (2) ample labor (in being or trainable without 
prohibitive expense); (3) management and technicians (in being, 
trainable without prohibitive expense or importable); (4) reason-
ably good transportation and communication facilities; and (5) 
a "favorable investment climate" (this includes a multitude of 
intangibles difficult to delineate precisely; their presence or ab-
sence, nonetheless, is readily apparent to any businessman or any 
businessman's lawyer). 
Second, private foreign investment-even in conjunction with 
5 STALEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2; Address, supra note 2. 
6 STALEY, op. dt. supra note 3, at 3. This is simply the practical aspect of the third 
humanitarian reason. See text at note 4 supra. 
7 Address, supra note 2. 
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ample public foreign investment to provide the infrastructure 
(i.e., transportation, communication, health, education, govern-
mental, etc., facilities)-is not alone sufficient to advance newly 
developing nations economically. Newly developing nations must 
be strongly motivated toward economic development.8 There is 
every indication, however, that this motivation exists.9 
If there is, then, adequate profit potential on the one hand 
and strong motivation on the other, the failure of sufficient pri-
vate investment to move to newly developing nations10 is due 
largely to political and other non-business risks.11 An important 
task, therefore, is to find a means of protecting investment in 
newly developing nations acceptable to both newly developing 
and capital-exporting nations (as well as, of course, foreign in-
vestors). In seeking a basis for common agreement, it may be 
useful to examine past attempts in this area and the progress that 
has been made. After that examination, the writer intends to sug-
gest what he believes to be a reasoned approach to protection of 
private foreign investment. 
I. A HISTORICAL CONSPECTUS 
A. Protective Measures by Capital-Exporting Nations 
What steps are capital-exporting nations taking to protect pri-
vate foreign investment against political and other non-business 
8 Wright, Closing the Production Gap, in PRIVATE INVESTMENT: THE KEY TO INTER-
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 39, 43 (Daniel ed. 1957): Economic growth is "almost 
a spiritual problem"; Galbraith, Conditions for Economic Change in Underdeveloped 
Countries, 33 J. FARM EcoNO!lfICS 689, 694 (1951): "A strong and effectively expressed 
desire for change" is a necessary element of economic development. Compare STALEY, 
op. cit. supra note 3, at 203, quoting Robert L. Gamer, formerly vice-president, Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development and president, International Finance 
Corporation: "Development is a state of mind. People have to develop themselves before 
they can change their physical environment and this is a slow process. • •• It involves 
changes in relations between classes and races. It requires improvement of governmental 
organization and operations; the extension of social institutions, schools, courts, and 
health services. These things take much longer than the building of factories and rail-
roads and dams." See also FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 
11-28 (1962). 
9 Snyder, Foreign Investment: The Other Side, 22 FED. B.J. 16, 24 (1962). 
10 Brandon, Survey of Current Approaches to the Problem, in THE ENCOURAGEMENT 
AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, lNT'L &: COMP. L.Q. SUPP. PUB. 
No. 3, at I (1962); Snyder, Protection of Private Foreign Investment: Examination and 
Appraisal, IO INT'L &: COMP. L.Q. 469, 471 (1961). 
11 Fatouros, Obstacles to Private Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Countries, in 
CURRENT LAw AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 194, 202-03, 205-10 (1961); Address of Lord Shawcross, 
director of the Association Internationale d'Etudes pour la Promotion et la Protection 
des Invcstissements Prives en Territoires Etrangers (APPI), before the Societe Royale 
d'Economie Politique de Belgique, Dec. 15, 1959, in Brussels, published in CoMPTES 
RENDUS DES TRAVAUX DE LA SocJETE RoYALE D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DE BELGIQUE No. 266, 
at 14 (English), 30 (French) (1960); Brandon, supra note 10, at 1-2; Snyder, supra note 10, 
at 472. 
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risks? The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Japan-alone among major capital-exporting nations-have nego-
tiated bilateral agreements with a number of newly developing 
nations.12 
The United States vehicle for this protection is its friendship, 
commerce and navigation treaties. Eleven of these treaties were 
concluded prior to 1939. Twenty-one have been concluded since 
1946, and fifteen of these are currently in force. These treaties 
contain provisions (applicable in the territory of each party) per-
mitting establishment of enterprises by nationals of each country 
in the territory of the other and protecting these enterprises 
against expropriation without payment of compensation.13 In 
general, they provide that property of a national of one country 
situated in the territory of the other may be taken only on pay-
ment of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. There 
are provisions, as well, for repatriation of profits and invested 
capital, and for arbitration of disputes arising out of investments 
made under the aegis of a treaty.14 
The United Kingdom has embarked on a similar program. 
The first treaty (called a treaty of commerce, establishment and 
navigation) was concluded with Iran on March 11, 1959.15 Provi-
sions allowing establishment of enterprises by nationals of one 
country in the territory of the other, providing for expropriation 
only with compensation and repatriation of capital and profits, 
and requiring arbitration of disputes are contained in this agree-
ment. Germany has concluded eight agreements of this nature 
with Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Iran, Malaya, 
Morocco, Pakistan, and Togo.16 Generally, the same sort of pro-
visions that appear in the treaties of the United States and the 
United Kingdom appear in the German treaties. Japan has con-
cluded two agreements, containing provisions generally similar 
to those in the United States, United Kingdom and German 
treaties, with Pakistan and the Philippines.17 
These bilateral agreements afford reasonably good-but not 
12 Brandon, supra note 10, at 4-5; Snyder, supra note 10, at 477. 
13 The difficulty with these treaties is that only one is with a Latin American 
country, one with an African country and none with an Arab country. Sec address of 
Lord Shawcross, "The Problems of Foreign Investment in International Law," in HAcuE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 102 REcuEIL DES CouRS 335 (1961). 
14 WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147-55, 
331-34 (1960). 
15 Treaty Between the United Kingdom and Iran on Commerce, Establishment and 
Navigation, March 11, 1959, Tehran, Iran, No. I, C:r.m. No. 698. 
16 Brandon, supra note 10, at 5. 
17 Ibid. 
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completely adequate-protection in countries where they are in 
force. But the major difficulty with them is that they do not cover 
many newly developing nations where political risks of expropria-
tion are great and where investors are reluctant to enter, in the 
absence of adequate protection.18 
B. Protective Measures by Newly Developing Nations 
What steps are newly developing nations taking to protect 
private foreign investment against political and other non-busi-
ness risks? A not inconsequential number have (I) enacted special 
legislation; (2) promulgated written government policy state-
ments; or (3) limited expropriation constitutionally.19 
Some special legislation guarantees investment against expro-
priation for a minimum period. For example, expropriation is 
prohibited in Cambodia for from ten to thirty years and in Indo-
nesia for from twenty to thirty years (depending upon the type of 
investment).20 On the other hand, the Approved Enterprises 
(Concessions) Act of Sudan secures fair and equitable compensa-
tion and its transfer out of Sudan.21 Other newly developing na-
tions' laws promise non-discriminatory treatment of foreign in-
vestors: for example, the Iranian and Jordanian laws encouraging 
and protecting private foreign investment.22 The agreement India 
consummated with the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, provid-
ing for construction of an oil refinery in India, assures that this 
refinery will not be expropriated for at least twenty-five years, 
and thereafter only on payment of "reasonable compensation."23 
These protections provide real advantages for potential foreign 
investors. But there are disadvantages as well: a country may 
quickly and retroactively change its written policy (particularly 
if there is a change in the governing faction); laws may also be 
changed quickly and retroactively; tautly drawn contracts not in-
frequently invite controversy, breach, and litigation; and, if the 
stakes are high enough, newly developing nations may even change 
constitutions with unseemly rapidity. 
18 Cf. U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 71 (1960). 
10 U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, Annex II (1960). This annex contains a "Selected List of 
Laws and Official Texts Concerning Foreign Private Investment in Under-developed 
Countries." These laws and texts contain legislative or executive prohibitions against 
appropriation. 
20 U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 64 (1960) . 
.21 Id. at 64-65. 
22 U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, Annex II, at 5-6 (1960). 
23 U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 65 (1960). 
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C. Investment Guarantee Programs 
Guarantee ( or insurance) programs have been in force in the 
United States since 1948 (though initially with regard only to 
currency inconvertibility for new investments in Europe); in 
Japan since 1956; and in Germany since 1959. 
The program of the United States was broadened in 1950 to 
include protection against expropriation or confiscation. In 1951, 
it was again broadened to make guarantees available in all coun-
tries which then received financial assistance from the United 
States. In 1956, protection against loss caused by war was included 
in the program. As a result of a major change in philosophy under-
lying the program, guarantees were restricted to investments in 
underdeveloped countries in 1959.24 Finally, the program (divided 
between the International Cooperation Administration-with re-
gard to "specific risk" coverage, and the Development Loan Fund 
-with regard to "all risk" coverage) was consolidated in 1961. 
The program is now administered by the Agency for International 
Development.25 It covers investments only in nations with which 
the United States has agreed to institute this program. 
There are-as indicated above-two types of guarantees: (1) 
so-called "specific risk" guarantees against loss due to expropria-
tion, currency inconvertibility, war, revolution or insurrection, 
and (2) "all risk" guarantees which insure loan investments 
against risks of every nature and equity investments against risks 
other than "normal business-type risks."26 
The convertibility protection covers not only absolute ex-
change blockage, but also (1) a prolonged failure by the newly 
developing nation to act upon an application for transfer, and 
(2) discriminatory changes in rates of exchange. The protection 
does not, however, extend to devaluation of a currency or general 
depreciation. Generally speaking, the coverage permits an investor 
to repatriate the equivalent of ninety-five percent of his insured 
local currency receipts. 
The expropriation guarantee protects against (1) governmental 
action preventing a foreign investor from controlling or disposing 
of his investment, and (2) abrogation, repudiation or impairment 
of a foreign government's contract with an investor-providing 
24 See THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD 24-25 (1963), a report 
by the Committee on International Trade and Investment, Section of International and 
Comparative Law, American Bar Association. 
25 International Development Act of 1961, §§ 221-24, 75 Stat. 429-32, 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 2181-84 (Supp. III, 1961). 
26 Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, § 101, as amended, 71 Stat. 357 (1957). 
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neither is due to an investor's fault or misconduct.27 (In case of a 
loan investment, however, expropriation will be considered to 
have taken place only if payment of principal or interest is pre-
vented.) A regulatory or revenue-producing measure adopted by 
a government with intent to divest the investor of his investment 
is covered by the expropriation guarantee, if, in fact, it does divest 
him of control or disposition. The amount paid an investor under 
an expropriation guarantee is the unrepatriated amount of the 
original investment increased or decreased by profit or loss ac-
crued since the investment was made. Reinvested profits (not to 
exceed an amount equal to the original investment) are generally 
covered. All right, title and interest in the expropriated invest-
ment vests in the United States Government when it pays a claim 
under the expropriation guarantee. 
War risk protection (available since 1956), along with protec-
tion against risk of revolution and insurrection (available only 
since September 4, 1961, the date of approval of the Act for Inter-
national Development of 1961), covers damage to physical prop-
erty up to ninety percent of the value of the investment. 
The all-risk guarantee covers a portion (usually not more than 
fifty percent in the case of an equity investment, and never more 
than seventy-five percent in either a loan or equity investment) 
of a loss incurred by a foreign investor for any reason other than 
the investor's fraud or misconduct or loss from a normally insur-
able risk. This guarantee is normally available only for "economic 
development projects furthering social progress and the develop-
ment of small independent business enterprises."28 
These guarantees are available only to United States citizens 
and to business entities organized in the United States and sub-
stantially owned (legally or beneficially or both) by United States 
citizens. Only a new investment, or expansion of an existing in-
vestment, may be covered. The coverage may not extend beyond 
twenty years. Generally, the premium is one-fourth of one percent 
per annum (of the coverage) for each type of coverage granted, 
i.e., expropriation, convertibility, war risk. There is provision for 
an additional "stand-by" fee of one-fourth of one percent in some 
instances. 
Unlike the United States program, the Japanese investment 
insurance program may extend to any country where a national 
27 International Development Act of 1961, § 223(b), 75 Stat. 431, 22 U.S.C. § 2183(b) 
(Supp. III, 1961). 
28 International Development Act of 1961, § 22l(b)(2), 75 Stat. 429, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2181(b)(2) (Supp. III, 1961). 
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of Japan has an investment.29 (There is a requirement, however, 
that the investment must aid in strengthening Japan's balance of 
payments situation.) Neither a loan nor an investment to estab-
lish a foreign subsidiary is insurable. Equity investments may be 
insured against loss of principal because of (1) expropriation or 
nationalization; (2) war, revolution, riot (or similar disturbance) 
or governmental action interfering with property, patents or 
mineral rights essential to operation of an investment; and (3) 
suspension of operation for six months or more because of an 
action in (2) above resulting in the investor disposing of his invest-
ment. Profits may be insured against loss because of inability to 
remit them for two years or more due to (1) exchange restrictions, 
(2) suspension of exchange transactions, or (3) freezing or con-
fiscation of profits. The premium is normally approximately 
three-fourths of one percent per annum of the coverage, but a 
greater premium may be charged for principal risks, if the risks 
appear unusually high. The amount of damage to be paid is com-
puted by deducting the larger of either one-half the dividends 
received or one-half the dividends expected by the investor when 
he purchased insurance, from the smaller of either the value of 
the original investment or the liquidation value of the invest-
ment. Only seventy-five percent of the loss is compensable; the 
remaining twenty-five percent must be borne by the investor. Like 
the United States guarantee program, this program vests all right, 
title and interest in the government of Japan upon payment of 
the loss.30 
The German investment guarantee program-as the United 
States one-is applicable only to countries which have entered 
into bilateral agreements with Germany or, temporarily, those 
countries which are determined by Germany to protect foreign 
investment adequately through general legislation or similar 
means, e.g., an assurance applicable to a particular investment.31 
For new investments strengthening Germany's relations with 
newly developing nations, guarantees may be purchased by Ger-
man nationals and by companies whose siege social is in Germany. 
Protection is afforded to equity as well as to loan investments 
(including an investment in a foreign subsidiary of a German 
company). Earnings from insured investments may be covered. 
29 STAFF REPORT, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT INSURANCE 27 (1962). 
30 Ibid. 
' 31 Id. at 28. As of January 1, 1962, Germany had entered into bilateral agreements 
".'ith Pakistan, Malaya, Greece, Togo, Morocco, Liberia, and Thailand. Negotiations were 
in progress with a number of other countries, however. 
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Coverage is extended to loss resulting from (1) outright and 
"creeping" expropriation; (2) war, revolution or insurrection; 
(3) inability to convert or transfer funds; or (4) blockage of pay-
ments or moratoria.32 It is limited to the original book value 
of the investment plus additional investment resulting in expan-
sion of the original undertaking. Normally, coverage is auto-
matically reduced at the end of the third year of the guarantee 
(and at the end of each year thereafter), by an amount stipulated 
in the guarantee agreement. Coverage is also proportionately 
reduced by a reduction in the original investment, e.g., by a 
repatriation of capital. Earnings may be covered in an amount 
not to exceed twenty-four percent of the original book value of 
the investment and not more than eight percent in any one year. 
Normally,· :fifteen years is the maximum duration of coverage, 
but in exceptional cases the coverage may be extended to twenty 
years. The premium charged for twenty-year coverage is one and 
one-half percent per annum of the coverage applicable at the 
beginning of a particular year (for fifteen years' coverage, it is 
one and one-fourth percent, and for ten and five-year coverage, 
it is one percent and three-fourths of one percent per annum, re-
spectively). In addition, a processing fee of one DM (Deutschmark, 
about twenty-five cents) per 1,000 for the first ten million DMs 
of guarantee and one-half DM per 1,000 for the remainder, is 
charged. This processing fee may not exceed 20,000 DMs. Not 
more than eighty percent of the loss is insurable, and upon pay-
ment of the loss the government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many acquires all right, title and interest in the expropriated 
investment. The amount of loss compensable is based on the value 
of the investment at the time the loss occurred. If there is a 
partial loss, the amount compensable is based on the difference 
between the value of the investment immediately before and im-
mediately after the loss occurs. Where there is a loss of earnings, 
the amount compensable is based on the unpaid amount of earn-
ings distributed during the term of the guarantee.33 
The disadvantages of these programs are evident. In all three, 
for example, only nationals and "national" investments are pro-
tected. Under the United States and German programs, protec-
tion is afforded in specific countries with which the United States 
and Germany have consummated apposite bilateral agreements. 
Moreoyer, guarantees are available only for certain specific invest-
32 Ibid. 
33 Id. at 29. 
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ments: in the United States, only for new investments (including 
additions to existing investments) in underdeveloped countries 
which further the development of the economic resources and 
productive capacity of the country;34 in Japan, only for invest-
ments strengthening Japan's balance of payments;35 in Germany, 
only for new investments· promoting economic relations with 
underdeveloped nations, generally.36 The premium cost is con-
sidered high in all three programs. In the case of the United States 
program it is even considered prohibitive for some investors.31 
Indeed, the United States program is not considered by some in-
vestors to be worth the time and effort it takes on the part of 
the investor to obtain the guarantee.38 This is particularly true-
some investors maintain-where the investment is in a highly 
competitive field requiring them to move quickly. German and 
Japanese investors object to the provision requiring self-insurance 
up to twenty-five percent of the loss incurred.39 Another disad-
vantage is that guarantee or insurance programs of this type skirt 
the necessity of developing legal principles and arbitral ( or, per-
haps, juridical) machinery for solving problems and disputes 
caused by investment in a foreign country. A final practical dis-
advantage is that a multilateral project, such as the aluminum 
project in Guinea (which involves companies from a numb~r of 
countries), cannot be uniformly insured under several diverse 
insurance systems.40 
II. MULTILATERAL PROPOSALS 
A. Transnational Arbitration 
The view that there may be a way of protecting private foreign 
investment, so that disputes and controversies between foreign in-
34 Id. at 24. Compare the finding that only about "one-quarter of the 54 respondents 
from the United States considered the U.S. program effective as a stimulant to new 
investment in the less developed countries. About 37% cited particular weaknesses." Id. 
at 39. 
35 Id. at 27. Compare the finding that "eighty per cent of the 22 respondents from 
Japan considered the Japanese program effective, to a greater or lesser extent, in 
stimulating overseas investment. About 20% described it as ineffective." Id. at 39. 
36 Id. at 28. Compare the finding that "none of the 22 respondents from Germany 
characterized the German program as effective; six (about half of those who replied) 
said it was inadequate, and the others noted particular provisions which they considered 
unsatisfactory." Id. at 39. 
37 Id. at 40; DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACTORS LIMITING U.S. INVESTMENTS ABllOAD pt. 2, 
at 26 (1954). Compare COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 1419, REPOllT 
ON THE PROTECTION OF PllIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTllIES 12 (1962). 
38 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, op. cit. supra note 37. 
39 STAFF REPORT, op. cit. supra note 29, at 39; Snyder, supra note 10, at 478. 
40 STAFF REPORT, op. cit. supra note 29, at 20, 48; Brandon, supra note 10, at 7. 
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vestors and newly developing nations are obviated, is simply a 
pathological belief in the impossible. Disputes of this nature will 
inevitably arise. Indeed, if it were otherwise, some of our pro-
fessional brethren would have to find new vineyards in which to 
labor. Some peaceful method, other than diplomacy, mediation 
and conciliation, for solving these disputes is a necessity.41 Is it 
unreasonable to conclude that the certainty of impartial, just and 
expeditious settlement of foreign investment disputes would en-
courage newly developing nations to be more thoughtful in their 
treatment of foreign investment? Is this not one of the goals of 
"protection of private foreign investment"? As a corollary, would 
not this sort of settlement of foreign investment disputes aid in 
encouraging foreign investors to invest in newly developing na-
tions? 
It is commonplace to say that a foreign investor is hesitant to 
allow adjustment of his grievance before a tribunal of the state 
allegedly causing the grievance--or in which the grievance arises. 
Similarly, a state which is a party to a grievance is hesitant about 
having its rights adjudicated by a tribunal of the state of which 
a complaining foreign investor is a national.42 This tends to per-
suade one that settlement of foreign investor disputes "under a 
tribunal or system of tribunals which will command general con-
fidence as to the fairness of their judgment and whose procedure 
will be supported by a public opinion which will not tolerate a 
departure from them" is wise.43 The concept has a respectable 
41 Snyder, Foreign Investment Protection: Is Institutional Arbitration an Answer?, 
40 N.C.L. R.Ev. 665, 666 (1962); cf. Snyder, Foreign Investment Protection: A Proposed 
Arbitration Convention, II J. PUB. L. 191 (1962); COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE 
AssEMDLY Doc. No. 1419, op. cit. supra note 37, at 19, 21, 30. 
42 See, e.g., INT'L LAw Ass'N, REP. OF 40TH CONFERENCE 174-75 (Amsterdam 1938): 
"Experience has taught that • • • the indispensable objectivity and impartiality [of 
national courts} are sometimes jeopardized by considerations of national interest; this 
occurs especially in cases in which considerable interests are at stake." Compare Jordan 
Inv., Ltd. v. V. O. Sojuzneftexport, Moscow Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, 
award of July 3, 1958, File No. 16/1957 [a translation appears in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 
800-06 (1959)]. Compare judgment of Bremen Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), 
Aug. 21, 1959, I U 159-201/1959, affirming a decision of the Landgericht, Bremen, April 
21, 1959, 7 Q 12-13/1959, denying an application for a preliminary injunction in an 
action by former Dutch lessors of Indonesian tobacco plantations against a German cor-
poration which had purchased the tobacco, with Senembah Maatschappij N. V. v. 
Republiek Indonesie Bank of Indonesia, No. 21/59, a decision of June 4, 1959, by the 
Appellate Court (Hof) of Amsterdam, affirming a decision of the District Court (Recht-
bank) of Amsterdam, Dec. 22, 1958, a strikingly similar case which arrived at a sub-
stantially opposite result from the German case. 
43 .Address by Herbert Brownell, Jr., then U.S. Attorney General, American Bar 
Association Convention, London, July 24-31, 1957, Time, Aug. 5, 1957, p. 8. Compare 
address by Lord Shawcross before the Societe Royale d'Economie Politique de Belgique, 
Dec. 15, 1959, published in Col\ll'TES RENDUs DES TRAVAUX DE LA SoCIETE RoYALE n'EcoNo-
MIE POLITIQUE DE BELGIQUE No. 266, at 2-23 (English), 24-40 (French) (1960). But cf. 
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history. 44 Thus, a not inconsequential body of informed current 
opinion hypothesizes that transnational arbitration45 is part of a 
reasoned approach to protection of private foreign investment.48 
Kopelmanas, The Settlement of Disputes in International Trade, 61 CoLUM. L. REY. 
384 (1961): "An exaggerated idea of the relative importance of authoritative procedure 
in the settlement of disputes has encouraged the position that the progress of inter-
national law depends mainly on establishing such international procedure. The recent 
evolution of international society shows, however, that better organization of inter-
national relations is more readily and efficiently obtained through concerted action by 
the subjects of international law. An effort to impose on them a supranational system 
for the settlement of disputes would, in the present inorganic stage of the international 
society, be premature." Id. at 384. 
44 See, e.g., Sohn, Proposals for the Establishment of a System of International 
Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 63 (Domke ed. 1958). 
45 The writer prefers "transnational" arbitration to "international" arbitration. See 
JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 32 (1956): "A Chile or an Indonesia feels poor for want 
of capital to develop its internal economy. The problem arising from these current 
yearnings or demands of the underdeveloped countries must be described as trans• 
national rather than international, since they involve the relations of, say, Indonesia 
not only to the United States for example but also to the private sources of American 
capital and to such intergovernmental organizations as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development." See also id. at 13-14, 78. 
46 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 76-81 (1960). This report states: "This dilemma 
[an investor's reluctance to rely either on foreign courts or the support of his own 
government] has led to the suggestion that alternative recourse be provided for such 
disputes before an international arbitral body. Arbitration has increasingly become a 
favoured method for resolving disputes arising in business relations." Id. at 77. See also 
AM. Soc'y INT'L LAw, REP. OF N.Y. REGIONAL MEEUNG 9-10 (1961), where Professor Louis 
B. Sohn states: "It is in the general interest of the international community to have 
clear standards, generally accepted standards, and to have them applied impartially 
by an impartial tribunal. If underdeveloped countries are not willing to accept impartial 
tribunals and international standards they are going to discover that there is not going 
to be investment in theni, and as a result, their development is going to suffer"; BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT, A ·woRLD INVESTMENT CONVENTION? 18 
(1959): "Every participating State would bind itself to accept recourse to an Arbitration 
Tribunal, if a dispute should arise out of the Convention"; U.N. Doc. No. E/AC.6/SR. 
282, at 5 (1960) (statement of undersecretary, Mr. de Seynes, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, U.N., to Economic Committee, ECOSOC: "[D]espite some reservations 
and hesitations, there was a clear trend in favour of some means of arbitration to deal 
with possible disputes between public authorities and foreign investors'); id. at 8 
(statement of representative, International Chamber of Commerce); id. at 9 (statement 
of Netherlands' delegate to Economic Committee, ECOSOC); id. at 14 (statement of 
Afghanistan's delegate to Economic Committee, ECOSOC); id. at 20 (statement of U.K.'s 
delegate to Economic Committee, ECOSOC); contra, id. at 11 (statement of U.S.S.R.'s 
delegate to Economic Committee, ECOSOC); for the formless, equivocal view of the 
U.S. delegate, see id. at 19: "The question of an international convention on arbitration 
of disputes posed ... difficulties ..•. [A]nd the extension of arbitration procedures to 
disputes arising between private investors and Governments raised still more complex 
questions.'' 
The APPI has prepared, as part of its draft international investment protection code, 
an annex providing for an arbitral tribunal [See 9 J. PUB. L. l18 (1960)]; the Inter-
national Bar Association, at both its seventh conference at Cologne, July 1958, and its 
eighth conference at Salzburg, July 1960, passed resolutions to consider establishing new 
international institutions to settle disputes concerning property rights and interests of 
aliens. At its 1962 conference in Edinburgh, July 1962, a committee on international 
arbitration procedure for the protection of investments abroad recommended that the 
Council of the International Bar Association "assume the task of giving final shape to 
the Association's views and convictions [on transnational arbitration] for the purpose of 
speedy adoption and implementation by the International Bar Association"; the Inter-
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Indeed, provisions for arbitration are contained in current pro-
posals for a multilateral investment protection convention.47 
The International Court of Justice is not available for solu-
tion of foreign investor-newly developing nation disputes; only 
states can be parties to litigation before it. 48 The same difficulty 
exists with regard to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (a mis-
nomer, since it is simply a panel of arbitrators-four of whom 
are selected by each signatory state-from which ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals may be formed).49 Consideration has been given to 
restructuring the International Court of Justice or the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration ( or both) so that non-state litigants can be 
parties to disputes before them. There are both practical and 
doctrinal reasons, however, why this has not been done-and why 
it does not appear probable that it will be done in the foreseeable 
future. Another solution to this problem must be sought. 
The United Nations has attempted to deal with this problem 
at some length and with considerable thoroughness through its 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).50 ESOSOC tends to 
favor "a special arbitration tribunal or panel, of outstanding neu-
trality and expertise, perhaps under the United Nations auspices, 
. . . on a regional basis."51 ECOSOC suggests that an arbitral 
tribunal for solution of investment disputes should be open to 
individuals-actual and legal-as litigants and not require that 
the investor's claim be espoused by its state of nationality. This 
national Law Association is working on the problem through its committee on juridical 
aspects of nationalization and foreign property. Compare Legislative Decree 2687 of 
Oct. 31, 1953, art. 12, Greece, regarding Investment and Protection of Foreign Capital; 
IBRD, Loan Regs. 3, 4, §§ 7.03-.04 (1961); INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 47TH INTER• 
PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE resolution II, at 45-47 (1958). 
47 See text infra at 1110 and note 46 supra. See also Snyder, Foreign Investment Pro• 
tection: A Proposed Arbitration Convention, 11 J. PUB. L. 191 (1962). 
48 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, para. I. 
40 However, article 47 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, 36 Stat. 2224 (1907), authorizes the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
to make its staff and premises available to any state signatory to that convention. [See 
Circular Note of the Secretary General, Permanent Court of Arbitration, March 3, 1960, 
with an unofficial translation of this circular note at 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 933 (1960).J 
This has been interpreted as allowing use of the staff and premises for resolution of 
disputes in which an individual-actual or legal-is a disputant. This provides only 
physical facilities, however. Rules for conducting arbitration and conciliation have now 
been promulgated by the Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. See 57 .AM. J. 
INT'L L. 500 (1963). 
50 U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 63-81 (1960). Both ECAFE (Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East) and ECE (Economic Commission for Europe) are concerning 
themselves with arbitration of trade disputes. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 10, at 483-85. 
These agencies could, of course, extend their inquiries to arbitration of investment 
disputes with little additional effort; there is no indication, however, that they intend 
to do so. 
51 U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 81 (1960). 
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appears to be an excellent idea with considerable persuasive sup-
port.52 
In May 1961 the United Nations issued a report which indi-
cates considerable interest on the part of various governments in 
implementing effective transnational arbitration. There are two 
reasons for this support: (1) it is believed that effective transna-
tional arbitration will improve the investment climate in newly 
developing nations and avoid disputes (to a degree, at least), and 
(2) it will allow expert, impartial solution for disputes not 
avoided.53 The United Nations, however, is attacking this prob-
lem with pristine caution. It intends merely to encourage the 
use of existing arbitral systems and to further ad hoc solution of 
disputes by establishing a panel of expert arbitrators from which 
ad hoc tribunals might be formed. In addition, it intends to draft 
model arbitration clauses for insertion in foreign investment con-
tracts, treaties and similar documents.54 ECOSOC has approved 
a resolution which requests the United Nations Secretariat to con-
tinue its work in attempting to provide transnational arbitration 
of investment disputes in cooperation with the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank).55 
At a meeting of the board of governors of the World Bank 
in Vienna on September 19, 1961, Mr. Eugene R. Black, presi-
dent, said: 
"[O]ur experience has confirmed my belief that a very useful 
contribution could be made by some sort of special forum 
for the conciliation or arbitration of these [investment] dis-
putes. . . . The fact that governments and private interests 
have turned to the Bank to provide this assistance indicates 
the lack of any other specific machinery for conciliation and 
arbitration which is regarded as adequate by investors and 
governments alike. I therefore intend to explore with other 
institutions, and with our member governments, whether 
52 Id. at 79-81. See also RALsroN, A QUE.Sr FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER 44 (1941); 
Sohn, supra note 44, at 65-73. Compare JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15 &: passim 
(1948); LAUTER.PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 10-11 &: passim (1950); U.N. 
Doc. No. A/CH.4/96, at 51, 58 (1956) (International Law Commission, Report on Inter-
national Responsibility, by F. V. Garcia-Amador, Special Reporter): "The alien ••• is 
a true subject of international rights"; Domke, The Settlement of International Invest-
ment Disputes, 12 Bus. LAw. 264, 267 (1957); INT'L LAw Ass'N, REP. OF 38TH CoNFERENCE 
75 (Budapest 1934). 
53 U.N. Doc. No. E/3492 (1961). 
54 Brandon, supra note 10, at 13. 
55 Resolution 836 (XXXII), Aug. 3, 1961. The role of the World Bank in settling 
investment disputes is well known. It aided in settling the dispute arising out of the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, as well as the dispute between the city of Tokyo 
and bondholders of the French Tranche, which had made a loan to Tokyo in 1912. 
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something might not be done to promote the establishment 
of machinery of this kind."56 
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
has prepared a draft of a uniform law on arbitration with respect 
to private international law, i.e., conflict of laws.57 This has been 
revised by the Council of Europe; the revised draft is being uti-
lized as the basis for a draft law by a committee of experts named 
by the Council.58 The International Bar Association (IBA), the 
British Parliamentary Group for World Government (BPGWG), 
the International Law Association (ILA) and the Association In-
ternationale d'Etudes pour la Promotion et la Protection des In-
vestissements Prives en Territoires Etrangers (APPl)-organiza-
tions with some standing and influence in the international arena 
-have either suggested or prepared draft conventions for trans-
national arbitration of foreign investment disputes.59 The writer 
has previously set out in some detail his specific suggestions for 
transnational arbitration.60 These will be succinctly covered later 
in this article. 61 
B. Multilateral Insurance Programs 
The most comprehensive study extant of a multilateral invest-
ment insurance program has been made by the World Bank.62 
The study points out several advantages (as well as some disad-
vantages) in such a program. One advantage is the. relative sim-
plicity (for both a newly developing and a capital-exporting na-
tion) of participation in one multilateral program as opposed to 
participation in a number of bilateral programs. A second ad-
vantage is a saving of money by nations, as a result of having to 
negotiate and administer only one multilateral program. A third 
66 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR REcoNSTRUcrION AND DEVELOPMENT, SUMMARY OF PRO-
CE£DINGS, 196} ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 9 (1961). 
117 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIFORM LAW ON 
ARBITRATION IN REsPEcr OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT Ill (1954). 
68 Letter to the writer, dated July II, 1961, from the Secretary-General, Council 
of Europe. The Council of Europe has more recently been urged to take a firm stand 
in favor of compulsory arbitration of foreign investment disputes. See COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 1419, op. cit. supra note 37, at 3 (this is a draft 
recommendation presented by the legal committee and the Assembly to the Committee 
of Ministers which has apparently taken no action on the recommendation to date); 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 1429, OPINION ON THE REPORT 
OF THE LEGAL COMMITTEE 2 (1962) (this is an opinion of the economic committee 
supporting the legal committee's draft recommendation). 
1iO Snyder, Foreign Investment Protection: Is Institutional Arbitration an Answer?, 
40 N.C.L. REv. 665, 668-69 &: n.16 (1962). 
60 Snyder, supra hote 47. 
61 See text infra at II I 7. 
62 STAFF REPORT, op. cit. supra note 29. 
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advantage is that one multilateral program would tend to develop 
a more uniform set of rules for investment protection than would 
a number of bilateral programs.63 Still another advantage lies in 
the fact that there would be uniformity of protection of invest-
ments by international consortia or similar groupings of investors 
of different nationalities.64 A fifth advantage is that risks under a 
multilateral insurance program would be spread over a greater 
number of premium-payers. This should result in a decrease of 
premium cost. There are caveats here, however: (1) since there 
is no initial actuarial basis for determination of premium cost, it 
might not initially be less costly than under bilateral programs-
where premium cost is also determined arbitrarily; (2) unless pre-
mium cost is based on the total amount of foreign investment 
exported by a particular capital-exporting country and the total 
amount received by a .particular newly developing nation, pre-
miums might not necessarily be proportionately lower for a par-
ticular investor in a particular country; (3) if the risk is to be 
spread between both capital-exporting and newly developing na-
tions, premium cost of the latter will obviously increase, since, 
under present bilateral insurance programs, newly developing 
nations are not required to pay premiums. A sixth advantage 
results from the possibility that the chances of achieving a mean-
ingful multilateral protection convention may be enhanced by 
virtue of the existence of a multilateral insurance program. Some 
countries-hesitant to undertake obligations concerning foreign 
investment in the "isolated context of an investment protection" 
convention-might not find it so onerous when the investment 
protection convention is combined with a multilateral insurance 
program. This may be true, because-other things being equal-
investors might be less hesitant about investing in countries cov-
ered by the insurance program than in countries not covered. 
This, in turn, may be an incentive to newly developing countries 
to participate in the program. If their participation involves ad-
herence to a meaningful investment protection convention, it 
seems possible they may be willing to subscribe to such a con-
vention. 65 
Yet another advantage is that a multilateral insurance program 
63 Id. at 19-20. 
64 Id. at 20. 
65 Id. at 21. On the other hand, political obstacles to subscribing to a multilateral 
investment protection convention confronting some newly developing nations should 
not be overlooked. Moreover, experience has proved that there• may be substantial 
difficulty in securing agreement on rules of conduct to be incorporated into such a 
convention. 
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may be a substantial deterrent to discriminatory action (with re-
gard to foreign investments) on the part of newly developing na-
tions. Even if a newly developing nation were not a participant 
in the program, it might well be hesitant to discriminate against 
an investment insured by a multilateral insurance program, and, 
similarly, a multilateral organization might not be reluctant to 
proceed against it, whereas a particular capital-exporting nation, 
acting alone, might be quite reluctant because of overweighing 
political considerations. Of course, if a newly developing nation 
were a participant in a multilateral insurance program, the de-
terrent effect might be even greater for three reasons: (I) the 
feeling of "belonging to a club," in conjunction with the prag-
matic consideration that participation financially obligates a newly 
developing nation if foreign investments are expropriated; (2) 
precipitant action by a newly developing nation would antagonize 
not only the nation of the investor's nationality against which 
action was taken, but, as well, other participating capital-exporting 
and newly developing nations; (3) a multilateral organization may 
be less reluctant to move positively and expeditiously to preclude 
unacceptable behavior on the part of a participating newly devel-
oping nation than a particular capital-exporting nation-because 
of political considerations a particular capital-exporting nation 
might have to weigh.66 A final advantage is that some investors 
feel that under a multilateral program they might enjoy greater 
impartiality and more freedom from political pressure generally 
than that enjoyed by capital-exporting countries which are parties 
to bilateral insurance programs. 67 
There are, of course, disadvantages. One is immediately ob-
vious: agreement on a multilateral insurance program (with what-
ever concomitant rules of conduct are necessary) is said by some 
to be more difficult and complex than agreement between only 
two countries.68 Moreover, where only one capital-exporting coun-
try is attempting to recoup a loss, that country has a variety of 
ways available to it, through diplomatic bargaining, to recoup 
the loss; a multilateral organization would seem to be virtually 
limited to recoupment in the form of adequate and prompt mone-
oo Id. at 21-22. 
07 Id. at 22, 
68 As an example of a striking paradox in this area, however, the International 
Chamber of Commerce conjectures: "Is it not also possible that a number of countries, 
which may have certain political reservations on entering into bilateral treaty relation-
ships, might be ready to set aside such reservations when dealing collectively with a 
number of partners?" INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE Doc. No. 111/112, 28.III, 
at 3 (1962). 
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tary compensation in a convertible currency.69 Finally, a multi-
lateral program may be procedurally more cumbersome, less flex-
ible and more impersonal than a bilateral one.70 
The World Bank study of the feasibility of a multilateral in-
surance program reveals that there are currently in existence 
twelve proposals by various organizations and individuals for such 
a program.71 These proposals appear to be carefully prepared and 
comprehensive. They consider: (1) scope of protection to be of-
fered; (2) criteria for eligibility of an investment; (3) investigation 
of eligibility of an investment; (4) application of the insurance 
to an existing (as opposed to a new) investment; (5) duration of 
the insurance; (6) amount and method of assessment of premiums; 
(7) proportion of loss to be covered; (8) maximum coverage per-
mitted for a particular investment; (9) participants in the pro-
gram; (10) organization and administration of the program; (11) 
capital contributions of participants; (12) distribution of liability 
for losses; (13) arrangements for compensating an investor; (14) 
arrangements by which a defaulting country reimburses the insur-
ance fund; (15) relationship of the program to any existing na-
tional insurance program; and (16) relationship of the program 
to any multilateral investment protection agreement.72 
The establishment of an effective multilateral insurance pro-
gram depends on a number of variable and complex factors. The 
World Bank takes the position that it can do little more in this 
regard than prepare the comprehensive study it has prepared. It 
points out that it must preserve its position as an impartial bank-
ing-lending agency serving both capital-exporting and newly de-
veloping nations. Moreover, the World Bank has not been able 
to establish to its satisfaction that private foreign investment 
would be encouraged to move to newly developing nations by 
institution of a multilateral insurance program. For that reason, 
it questions the wisdom of financial commitments necessary to 
establish the program. 
In the final analysis, establishment of such a program-assum-
ing it is justified on practical grounds-would seem to depend 
on the willingness and ability of capital-exporting and newly de-
veloping nations to provide the impetus to establish the program. 
69 STAFF REPORT, op. cit. supra note 29, at 22-23. 
70 Id. at 22. 
71 Id. at 30-37. These proposals are (I) APP! proposal, (2) Council of Europe proposal, 
(3) Hood proposal, (4) Jalan proposal, (5) Maffry proposal, (6) Osborne proposal, (7) Pont-
zen proposal, (8) Reyre proposal, (9) Straus proposal, (IO) Tilney-BagnaII proposal, (II) 
Van Eeghen proposal, and (12) Zolotas proposal. 
72 Ibid. 
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This involves the rather difficult-sometimes intractable-me-
chanical processes of setting up the necessary administrative ma-
chinery, no less than the fundamentally important acquisition of 
adequate financial backing from participating nations-private in-
vestors are not able to finance an undertaking of this sort.73 In 
addition, nations are going to have to be willing to accept risks 
and compensate for losses resulting from sometimes ill-advised acts 
that are neither theirs nor controllable by them. They must, in 
short, be ready to accept the burdens of living in a civilized, eco-
nomic and (to a degree, at least) political international community. 
There is presently no firm indication that a significant number of 
nations are ready to accept these burdens; one cannot, therefore, 
be sanguine about agreement on a multilateral insurance program 
in the foreseeable future. 
C. Multilateral Protection Convention 
There is a considerable amount of activity in the direction of 
the formulation of a multilateral investment protection convention. 
On the other hand, a body of respectable opinion questions the 
acceptability of a multilateral protection convention on a signifi-
cantly broad basis in the foreseeable future.74 This body of opin-
ion hypothesizes that any multilateral convention that gains rea-
sonably widespread acceptance among both capital-exporting and 
newly developing nations will have to be so watered down that it 
will be virtually meaningless. In short, the common denominator 
of such a convention would necessarily be so common that it would 
not be helpful to either newly developing nations or foreign in-
vestors. The suggestion is that the only workable approach to 
this problem is a binational one.75 
But whatever the chances for reasonably widespread accept-
ance in the foreseeable future of a multilateral protection con-
73 Brandon, Survey of Current Approaches to the Problem, in THE ENCOURAGEMENT 
AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, INT'L & COMP. L.Q. SUPP. 
Pon. No. 3, at 9 (1962). 
74 See, e.g., FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 69-189 (1962); 
RUBIN, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 82-83 (1956); Metzger, Multilateral Conventions for 
the Protection of Private Foreign Investment, 9 J- PuB. L. 133-34 (1960); Miller, 
Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention, 53 AM. J- INT'L 
L. 371, 376-78 (1959); Proehl, Private Investments Abroad, 9 J. PUB. L. 362, 372 (1960). 
Compare Larson, Recipients' Rights Under an International Investment Code, 9 J. 
Pun. L. 172 (1960); Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, in 
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVEST· 
MENTS ABROAD 45, 84-87 (1961). Contra, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR "WoRLD 
GOVF..RNMENT, A WORLD INVESTMENT CONVENTION? 7-8 (1959); Snyder, Protection of 
Private Foreign Investment: Examination and Appraisal, 10 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 469, 
490-94 (1961). 
75 Metzger, supra note 74, at 143-46. See text supra at 1089-90. 
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vention, one cannot conduct even a cursory survey of problems 
surrounding encouragement and protection of foreign investment 
without considering the following major proposals for such a 
convention. 
First: The British Parliamentary Group for World Govern-
ment-composed of knowledgeable, interested members of the 
British House of Commons, of all political parties-established a 
commission on a world investment convention in March 1958 
with this goal: 
"To attempt to formulate a World Investment Code in 
order to develop greater international confidence conducive 
to investment on the basis that both investors and investees, 
whether they represent government finance or private enter-
prise, will benefit from their rights and obligations being 
mutually agreed and assured, and to examine the conditions 
under which such a Code could be legally enforceable, and 
for this purpose to consider the availability of capital in dif-
ferent parts of the world and the disparity between developed 
and under-developed countries."76 
This commission published a useful report on the feasibility 
of a multilateral investment protection convention.77 The report 
indicates that the convention it visualizes would broadly enun-
ciate only "a very few general rules"; it would formulate objec-
tives and procedures for protection of private foreign investment.78 
The report also thoughtfully considers the fundamental question: 
is formulation of a convention of this sort-acceptable to both 
capital-exporting and newly developing nations-possible in the 
foreseeable future? It hints that success may not be impossible.79 
More recently, however, "in so far as thought has developed [in 
the British Parliamentary Group for World Government] on this 
whole question, it is that taken alone, the idea of a world invest-
ment convention does not seem to be enough to engender a po-
litical will to see that it occurs. We have, therefore, noted with 
satisfaction the work which the World Bank has been putting into 
study of multilateral investment insurance. Perhaps taken to-
gether, these two ideas could better effect a break-through than 
can either by itself."80 
76 BRITISH PARUAMENTARY GROVP FOR WoRI.D GOVERNMENT, op. dt. supra note 74, at 5. 
77 Ibid. The report referred to is Document PGWG 590715.196C, published in July 
1959. It suggests a "World Investment Convention, backed by a Secretariat to administer 
it and an Arbitration Tribunal to deal with disputes." Id. at 6. 
78 Id. at 15. 
79 Id. at 7-8. 
so Letter to the writer, dated July 9, 1962, from Patrick Armstrong, clerk to the 
British Parliamentary Group for World Government. 
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Second: The Swiss government has prepared a draft conven-
tion on guarantees. Its principal concern, however, is with repa-
triation of an investment and its profits, compensation for "creep-
ing" or outright expropriation, and currency convertibility. This 
draft convention was submitted to the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1959 (now the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD).81 
Third: The Council of Europe has had under consideration 
since 1958 a proposed regional investment convention applying 
only to African countries.82 This convention proposes (I) an in-
vestment statute; (2) a guarantee and financial assistance fund; 
and (3) expansion of technical assistance. The Consultative As-
sembly of the Council, in 1958, recommended the convening of 
a conference to be held, if possible, in Africa. Attendance would 
be open to (I) all member countries of the Council; (2) all in-
terested African countries; and (3) all competent international 
organizations. 83 
This conference would have the task of preparing a draft in-
vestment statute, establishing a guarantee fund and presumably 
laying a foundation for establishment of a financial assistance 
fund and technical assistance program. No action was taken on 
this 1958 recommendation; the Assembly repeated the recom-
mendation in its 1959 and 1960 sessions. Nonetheless, such a 
conference has not yet been held. The thoughtful and compre-
hensive work of the Council, however, has been valuable as a 
stimulant. More recently, the Council of Europe has been urged 
by its legal committee: 
"With regard to a multilateral investment convention: 
(a) that the member Governments should actively support 
the work of OECD for the preparation and conclusion of 
an international convention reaffirming the general rules 
of international law for the protection of foreign property 
and should seek to obtain the adherence to such a con-
vention by both capital-supplying and capital-receiving 
States; 
"TVith regard to an International Guarantee Fund: 
(b) that it should appoint a committee of experts with m-
s1 Brandon, supra note 73, at IO. 
82 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSE?IIBLY Doc. No. 1027, REPORT ON AN 
INVESTMENT STATUTE AND A GUARANTEE FUND AGAINsr POLITICAL RlsKs (1959); COUNCIL OF 
EUROPEAN CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Doc. No. ASIJUR(l2), POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING AN 
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN lNVEsrMENT IN UNDER-DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES (1960). 
83 Ibid. 
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structions to examine urgently the proposal already made 
by the Assembly for the institution of an international 
guarantee fund against non-commercial risks and consider 
and report whether a second convention should be pre-
pared which could later serve as a basis for discussion with 
regional groupings of interested countries, not merely in 
Africa, as proposed earlier by the Assembly, but, where 
appropriate, in other parts of the world. 
"With regard to compulsory arbitration: 
(c) that both conventions should contain a clause providing 
for compulsory arbitration in the event of disputes or for 
their settlement by other judicial means; 
( d) that similar provisions for compulsory arbitration should 
be included in future bilateral treaties, such as those con-
cluded in recent years by the Governments of the United 
States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and in contracts made between investors and capital-
receiving governments; 
"Finally: 
(e) that the long-term objective should be a worldwide in-
vestment convention; the conclusion of such an instru-
ment, that is to say a generally acceptable convention 
probably stemming from the OECD Convention and pro-
viding for compulsory arbitration in the event of disputes 
arising over the treatment accorded to foreign property 
would, if feasible, constitute a valuable step forward." 84 
This urging by the legal committee has been strongly sup-
ported by the Council's economic committee: 
"The Economic Committee: 
1. Supports the proposal that the Committee of Ministers 
urgently re-examine Recommendation 211 on the insti-
tution of an International Guarantee Fund against polit-
ical risks with a view to preparing a Convention to im-
plement this idea; in this connection it should be stressed 
that the Economic Committee believes that the regional 
approach in the frame-work of groupings of countries with 
common interests advocated in Recommendation 211 
offers the best prospect of success; 
2. Supports the proposal that member Governments should 
actively press on with the work carried on within the 
84 COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 1419, REPORT ON THE PROTEC• 
TION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2·3 (1962). 
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OECD for the conclusion of a multilateral convention for 
the protection of foreign property; 
3. Supports the proposal that both these conventions should 
contain provisions for compulsory arbitration in the event 
of disputes and that similar provisions be included in fu-
ture bilateral investment treaties."85 
Fourth: The International Chamber of Commerce prepared 
a proposed International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign 
Investment, 86 which was approved by its Quebec congress in June 
1949. The proposed code provides for protection of foreign in-
vestment against risks of discrimination, nationalization and cur-
rency restrictions. It also provides for arbitration of disputes. In 
December 1960-going a step farther-the International Cham-
ber of Commerce convened a useful and unique international 
businessmen's conference in Karachi, Pakistan. This conference, 
December 5-8, 1960, was held primarily to obtain the views of 
business leaders in both capital-exporting and newly developing 
nations on provisions that should be contained in a convention 
for protection of private foreign investment. The first of its kind 
held in Asia, it was attended by businessmen from twenty-eight 
nations vitally concerned in promoting economic development, 
both internationally and in their respective countries. Represent-
atives of a number of nations normally classed as less developed 
were present: Burma, Ceylon, India, Iran, Korea, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic 
(then composed of both Egypt and Syria), Vietnam and Yugoslavia. 
A "Statement of Conclusions" was unanimously approved by the 
conference.87 This statement says in part, "Nationalization-if 
applied at all-should be non-discriminatory and accompanied by 
prompt, effective and adequate compensation."88 Moreover, it 
asserts that old as well as new investment should be afforded this 
protection. The conference concluded that the International 
Chamber of Commerce's International Code of Fair Treatment 
for Foreign Investment "should be reviewed by the ICC in the 
light of the opinions expressed at the Karachi conference and by 
85 COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 14~9. OPINION ON THE REPORT 
OF THE Ll:GAL COllllllITTEE 1-2 (1962). 
86 INTERNATIONAL CHAlllBER OF COllllllERCE BROCHURE No. 200, ATTRACTING FOREIGN 
INVESI'l\lENT 9-12 (1960). 
87 I11.'TERNATIONAL CHAlllBER OF CollllllERCE Doc. No. IBC/129, Statement of Conclu-
sions (1960) (Statement of the International Businessmen's Conference at the 9th Session 
of the Commission on Asian and Far Eastern Affairs of the ICC). 
88 Id. at 2. 
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various national committees of the ICC."89 The trend of thought 
of the International Chamber of Commerce today, however, ap-
pears to be toward a multilateral insurance program combined 
with some sort of multilateral protection convention.00 
Fifth: There is the Abs/Shawcross draft convention on invest-
ments abroad, of April 1959.91 This draft convention evolved out 
of two earlier draft conventions. One was prepared by the Society 
to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investments (a group of 
German bankers, lawyers and economists); the other was prepared 
by a group of English and continental lawyers under the chair-
manship of Lord Shawcross, a director of the APPI. Succinctly, 
three general principles of international law are embodied in 
this draft convention: (I) non-discrimination and its corollary-
fair and equitable treatment of investments; (2) pacta sunt ser-
vanda; and (3) prompt, adequate and effective compensation in 
the event of expropriation ("creeping" or outright) or nation-
alization of an investment. Moreover, an annex proposes estab-
lishment of an arbitral tribunal.92 This draft convention was 
submitted by the German Government to the OEEC in 1959,93 
and was carefully considered by that organization's committees. 
When the OECD came into being on September 30, 1961, the 
drafting of a multilateral protection convention was one of the 
items carried over from the OEEC. The legal adviser to the 
OEEC (and to the present OECD) prepared a number of suc-
cessive draft conventions with notes and comments. These drafts 
have been discussed by a working group of legal experts, as well 
as by the committee for invisible transactions.94 It is significant 
to note that United States representatives at the OECD have not 
89 Id. at 4. 
90 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE Doc. No. 111/114 (1962): "[A]lthough the 
ICC is not yet in a position to express a final opinion on all aspects of the extremely 
complex question treated here [the feasibility of a multilateral insurance program] it 
believes that the discussions and investigations it has so far conducted indicate clearly 
that the idea of a multilateral system of investment insurance deserves the most careful 
consideration from governments, • . • as a means of promoting the economic expansion 
of the developing countries through an increased flow of private investments from abroad." 
Id. at 5. "The broad consensus of opinion within the ICC is that it would be desirable 
to combine the insurance scheme with a [multilateral investment protection] code .• , • 
There are even many w:f\o strongly hold that unless this is done the whole insurance 
scheme should be dropped. Others would not go so far as this and would deprecate 
making the fate of the insurance scheme dependent upon agreement concerning rules 
of conduct." Id. at 3. 
91 See 9 J. PUB. L. 116-18 (1960). 
92 Id. at 118. 
93 Brandon, supra note 73, at 10. 
94 THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD 20-21, 59 (1963), a report 
by the Committee on International Trade and Investment, Section of International and 
Comparative Law, American Bar Association. 
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taken an active part in consideration of this draft convention; in-
deed, there is some indication that the United States does not 
support the underlying principles of this convention.95 It is be-
lieved that the committee for invisible transactions will shortly 
submit to the Council of the OECD a proposed draft multilateral 
protection convention. This will be an important step; it should 
aid in moving closer to the ultimate goal of an adequate, accept-
able method of encouraging and protecting foreign investment. 
Sixth: A useful, tangential work in this area is the Convention 
on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 
prepared by the Harvard Law School.96 This comprehensive con-
vention resulted from a suggestion by personnel of the United 
Nations Secretariat that the Harvard Law School could assist the 
United Nations by bringing up to date the Harvard draft con-
vention of 1929 on this subject. The convention will be utilized 
by the International Law Commission in its further deliberations 
in the area of nationalization.97 The value of the Harvard con-
vention lies in its exhaustive, detailed, competent treatment of the 
entire problem of responsibility of states for injuries to aliens (it 
treats the broader area as its title indicates) in codified form. It 
will doubtless be an important reference work for anyone seriously 
and meticulously working in this area. It is submitted, however, 
that it is not the sort of convention that may achieve reasonably 
widespread acceptance among capital-exporting and newly devel-
oping nations in the foreseeable future. 
Seventh: In addition to these not inconsiderable efforts, other 
organizations have registered support for some sort of protection 
for private foreign investment. Among these are (I) the Inter-
national Parliamentary Union at its conferences in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1958 and Warsaw in 1959;98 (2) the World Federation of United 
Nations Associations in 1958;99 (3) the International Conference 
of Manufacturers at its conference in London in 1960;100 (4) the 
International Bar Association at its conferences in Cologne in 
1958, Salzburg in 1960 and Edinburgh in 1962;101 (5) the Inter-
011 Letter to Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, dated Nov. 22, 1961, from working 
group on multinational guarantees of foreign investments (signed by G. M. Doppelt, 
chairman), Committee on International Trade and Investment, Section of International 
and Comparative Law, American Bar Association. 
06 See Sohn &: Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests 
of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1961). 
97 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIO~AL LAW PROCEEDINGS 107-98 (1960). 
08 Brandon, supra note 73, at 11. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, Oct. 7, 1960, p. 7-B, col. 3. 
101 INT'L BAR Ass'N, REP. OF 7TH CONFERENCE (Cologne, July 1958); id., REP. OF 8TH 
CONFERENCE (Salzburg, July 1960); id., REP. OF 9TH CONFERENCE (Edinburgh, July 1962). 
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national Law Association at its conferences in New York in 1958, 
in Hamburg in 1960 and in Brussels in 1962;102 (6) the European 
League for Economic Cooperation in 1958;103 (7) the European 
Federation of Industrial Organizations; (8) the Swiss Bankers' As-
sociation; (9) L'Institut Internationale d'Etudes Bancaires; and 
(10) the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.104 
III. A CRITIQUE 
There is, unfortunately, a near fatal defect in the two most 
vigorously asserted multilateral protection conventions-viz., the 
International Chamber of Commerce's Code of Fair Treatment 
for Foreign Investment and the Abs/Shawcross draft convention: 
these conventions read like "a statement of banker's terms sought 
to be elevated to the dignity of law."105 For example, the Abs/ 
Shawcross draft convention (from which has evolved the OECD 
draft convention) has evoked these specific, thoughtful words: 
"[I]t lacks expressions of mutuality, something which cannot be 
achieved merely by eliminating objectionable provisions from suc-
cessive drafts, but only by balancing specifics against specifics."100 
The Abs/Shawcross draft convention-let it be said initially-
is considerably less one-sided than its predecessor, the 1957 draft 
convention of the German Society to Advance the Protection of 
Foreign Investments. But its philosophy has been succinctly ex-
pressed by one of its authors, Lord Shawcross: 
"[T]he quid pro quo for the borrowing States' undertak-
ings is in fact, in the English vernacular the provision of the 
'quids,' that the capital importing countries in return for 
agreeing to abide by the generally recognized procedures of 
International Law will receive more private investment and 
with the capital, the benefits of the technical and commer-
cial skills which go with them, than would otherwise be the 
case."107 
102 INT'L LAW Ass'N, REP. OF 48TH CONFERENCE 343-74 (New York 1958); id., REP. OF 
49TH CONFERENCE (Hamburg 1960); id., REP. OF 50TH CONFERENCE (Brussels 1962). 
103 U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 74 n.l (1960); COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY 
Doc. No. AS/JUR(l2)4, POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING AN INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 3 (1960). 
104 POLICY DECLARATION ON WORLD AFFAIRS, EcoNOMIC-PoLmCAL 7-8, 26-29 (1960-
1961) (adopted by the members of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States). 
105 Compare Proehl, Private Investments Abroad, 9 J. Pun. L. 362, 363 (1960). 
106 Ibid. See also CoUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE AssEMBLY Doc. No. 1419, op. cit. 
supra note 84, at 17-18; id., Doc. No. 1429, op. cit. supra note 85, at 4. 
107 Address by Lord Shawcross before the Society To Advance the Protection of 
Foreign Investments, Dec. 7, 1959, in Cologne, Germany; address by Lord Shawcross 
before the Societe Royale d'Economie Politique de Belgique, Dec. 15, 1959, in Brussels, 
Belgium. The former is contained in GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FoRDERUNG DES SCHUTZES VON 
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If one can accurately unscramble Shawcross' scrambled syntax, one 
may venture that he meant that newly developing nations will get 
more capital and modern technology if they play the game ac-
cording to traditional international law rules. Their getting this 
additional capital and technology is the quid pro quo for their 
assuming traditional international law obligations. The philoso-
phy of this draft convention is supported by its drafters, more-
over, on the basis that newly developing nations may set out their 
rights in legislation and impose obligations on investors by terms 
in contracts they make with these investors.108 There is, of course, 
considerable merit in this position. But the plain fact is that there 
has been no great rush by newly developing nations to embrace 
this convention or its basic philosophy. There are a number of 
reasons for this reluctance; but the fact that this convention is 
not evenhanded-to use Professor Proehl's thought, it does not 
balance "specifics against specifics"-is a not inconsiderable .factor 
for the reluctance, in the view of several learned writers.109 
A careful study of the OECD draft convention reveals that it 
is somewhat more evenhanded than the Abs/Shawcross conven-
tion. In the view of the writer, however, it is not sufficiently even-
handed to attract widespread acceptance among newly developing 
nations in Latin America, Africa and Asia. 
As indicated above, 110 several persons working in this area are 
not at all optimistic of achieving-within the foreseeable future-
widespread acceptance of a multilateral investment protection 
convention.111 What, then, do these persons suggest to encourage 
and protect private foreign investment? Some suggest that capital-
exporting and newly developing nations enter into bilateral agree-
ments. They point to the fact that the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Japan have negotiated bilateral agree-
ments to accomplish this.112 More and more, however, there is a 
turning toward a multilateral investment insurance or guarantee 
program.113 But is a multilateral insurance program, standing 
alone, sufficient? There is at least one knowledgeable, influential 
AusLANDSINVESTITIONEN e. V. Pub. 3, at 46-60; the latter is contained in COMPTES RENDUS 
DES TRAVAUX DE LA SocIETE RoYALE D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DE BELGIQUE No. 266, at 2-23 
(English), 24-40 (French) (1960). 
10s Ibid. 
100 Compare preceding materials cited in note 74 supra, with BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY 
GROUP FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 74, at 8. 
110 See text supra at 1105. 
111 See materials cited in note 74 supra. 
112 See text at notes 12-18 supra. 
113 See text at notes 62-73 supra. Compare COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE As-
SEMDLY D_oc. No. 1419, op. cit. supra note 84, at 16. 
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international organization which leans toward the position that 
a multilateral investment protection convention would be useful 
as an adjunct of an insurance program.114 Such a convention 
would delineate the legal and quasi-legal context in which the 
insurance program would operate. 
There are defects in each of these approaches: the bilateral 
approach simply avoids the thorny problem of feasibility of some 
sort of multilateral approach; the multilateral approach does not 
come to grips with the equally thorny problem of an adequate, 
impartial, expeditious, widely acceptable means of resolving for-
eign investor-newly developing nation disputes. It is, of course, 
understandable that there are those who take the firm position 
that a multilateral program-either insurance or a convention for 
investment protection, or both-is not possible in the present 
world political and economic structure. The position is based, 
in part, on the past failure of attempts at multilateral investment 
protection conventions-ranging from 1929 to 1957.115 But the 
sober truth is that there has been no intensive, empirical attempt 
to discover whether this position is true today-to discover, for 
example, (1) what provisions newly developing nations consider 
acceptable in a multilateral investment protection convention, 
and (2) whether there may be a common meeting ground for 
agreement (on either a multilateral insurance program or an in-
vestment protection convention) between most newly developing 
and capital-exporting nations. Indeed, the multilateral insurance 
study of the World Bank took into account only the views of 
investors. 
As was pointed out previously, 116 blinking the need for an 
adequate, impartial, expeditious, widely acceptable means of re-
solving foreign investor-newly developing nation disputes is il-
lusory and unrealistic. Through draft conventions now in exist-
ence (e.g., the proposed International Chamber of Commerce 
114 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE Doc. No. 111/114 (1962). Compare STAFF 
REPORT, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL 
INVESTMENT INSURANCE 21 (1962); COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 
1419, op. cit. supra note 84, at 16. 
115 Snyder, supra note 74, at 472-75. The first proposed agreement was drafted by a 
League of Nations conference in 1929. It was not acceptable to nations as a standard of 
conduct. A second attempt was made at the Ninth International Conference of American 
States in 1948. Agreement could not be reached on crucial provisions of the proposed 
convention. A third attempt was made at the Economic Conference of the Organization 
of American States in 1957. The conference could not reach agreement on widely accept-
able proposals. 
116 See text supra at 1096-97. Compare Abdel-Wahab, Economic Development Agree-
ments and Nationalization, 30 U. CINC. L. REv. 418, 420 (1961); Dant, The Unused 
Potential of the World Court, 40 FOREIGN ·AFFAIRS 462, 467 (1962). 
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Code of Fair Treatment and the Abs/Shawcross and OECD draft 
conventions) we have made considerable progress toward deter-
mining what capital-exporting nations consider to be acceptable 
provisions in a multilateral investment protection convention. On 
the other hand, there has been only one minor attempt to deter-
mine what provisions newly developing nations consider accept-
able in such a convention. In 1959 a commission of the British 
Parliamentary Group for World Government (which was presum-
ably hampered by lack of funds and time) attempted to determine 
this.117 It did it in two ways: (I) it invited the Hon. K. A. Gbede-
mah, then Minister of Finance in Ghana; Mr. Yusaf Ismail, then 
Minister-Counsellor of the Indonesian Embassy, London; H. E. Dr. 
Paz Estenssoro, then Bolivian Ambassador in London, previously 
President of Bolivia (1952-1956); and Mr. T. Swaminathan, then 
Minister (Economics) of the Indian High Commissioner's Office, 
London, to express their views;118 and (2) by drafting a proposed 
multilateral investment protection convention and circulating it 
to all Commonwealth finance ministers. The response to the latter 
was disappointing. "The reason was clearly that the sight of an 
official-looking document at once put them [Commonwealth fi-
nance ministers] into their official frame of mind and made them 
very cautious not to commit themselves."119 
IV. A REASONED APPROACH 
The ·writer suggests a two-fold approach to the problem of the 
protection of private foreign investment. 
I. If foreign investors and capital-exporting nations are really 
serious in desiring to find out if a multilateral protection conven-
tion or insurance program ( or both) is feasible, and what provi-
sions are acceptable to newly developing nations, there are prac-
tical, commonsense, relatively inexpensive means of doing this. 
It may be done in either of two ways. First, approach officials of 
newly developing nations-these officials must, of course, be the 
ones vitally concerned in the economic development of these na-
117 See BRmSH PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR 'WORLD GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 74. 
118 Id. at 8. The number of persons who gave their views was so small as scarcely 
to be considered representative of the views of newly developing nations. The BPGWG 
commission discovered that the representatives interviewed agreed to a multilateral 
convention in principle (although one suggested that bargaining power of the newly 
developing nations was so weak he would prefer not entering into a permanent conven-
tion until it became stronger and more funds for investment in newly developing nations 
became available). 
110 Letter to the writer, dated Aug. 16, 1962, from J. H. M. Pinder, formerly joint 
honorary secretary of the BPGWG commission, now director, International Operations, 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, London. 
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tions-to obtain their views on provisions newly developing na-
tions consider acceptable in (a) a multilateral protection convention 
( encouraging and protecting foreign investment); (b) a multilat-
eral insurance program; or (c) both in conjunction. This im-
portant task should be handled by able persons knowledgeable in 
the problems for which answers are sought. These persons must 
have no axe to grind; they must be impartial, objective, tactful and 
searching; their questions must be so framed and their interviews 
so conducted that they can keep officials from recriminations and 
diatribes on the one hand, and from wandering too far afield 
and presenting too diverse views, on the other. In short, they 
should seek constructive views on provisions newly developing na-
tions consider acceptable in a multilateral convention. This is 
apparently not the approach the United States Department of 
State suggests.120 But it is-to appropriate apposite words used 
in another context-"eminently pragmatic, and its recognition 
ultimately, if not immediately,"121 may prove helpful in furthering 
profits and ownership abroad. 
Second, approach officials of newly developing nations with a 
draft multilateral protection convention and a draft multilateral 
insurance program in hand. The draft protection convention 
should contain provisions that are balanced, reciprocal and as spe-
cific as possible-at least, more than a set of bare principles-and 
should be utilized as a basis for discovering what alterations or 
additions newly developing nations desire in the draft conven-
tion. The draft insurance program should similarly be reasonably 
complete and should serve a purpose similar to that of the draft 
convention. Moreover, the convention should be drafted so that 
it could be used either in conjunction with the insurance pro-
gram, or, alone, simply as an investment protection convention. 
If drafting a convention in this way is not possible, then it will 
doubtless be necessary either to (a) draft two conventions-one 
that will codify the legal and quasi-legal context in which a multi-
lateral insurance program might operate, and one utilizable sim-
ply as a multilateral protection convention, or (b) determine 
whether to concentrate efforts on a multilateral insurance program 
and accompanying convention, or simply on a multilateral pro-
tection convention. In view of the experience of the British Par-
liamentary Group for World Government,122 the former approach 
set out may be preferable. But it should be made clear that the 
120 See Metzger, supra note 74, at 143-46. 
121 Proehl, supra note 74, at 371. 
122 See text at note 119 supra. 
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sort of work entailed in implementing either of the suggestions 
above is worthwhile only if nations and investors are quite serious 
in determining whether something on the order of a multilateral 
protection convention or insurance program is feasible. If, on the 
other hand, nations and investors are interested only in fencing 
and jockeying without a real attempt to arrive at a workable solu-
tion other than a series of ad hoc ones-though it is realized that 
this course may be necessary or wise under present circumstances 
-then the fruitfulness of this approach is highly doubtful. 
If this approach is properly used, the writer feels that the result 
would be an accurate, concise picture of what newly developing 
and capital-exporting nations can hope to agree on in a meaning-
ful multilateral investment protection convention or a multilat-
eral insurance program, or both standing together. Implementa-
tion and successful conclusion of this suggestion may well be quite 
difficult. Indeed, many may be able ·to think of a number of rea-
sons why this approach is not feasible. It would be helpful if they 
would recall the words of Lord Denning: some lawyers find 
difficulties for every solution; other lawyers find solutions for 
every difficulty. It is submitted that no one will ever really know 
if this approach is feasible unless it is tried. Before it is written 
off as impractical, serious consideration should be given to it. 
2. The second part of the writer's suggested two-fold approach 
seeks to answer the question of how disputes between newly de-
veloping nations and foreign investors can be impartially, expe-
ditiously and practicably solved. The ·writer's suggestion is that 
there be transnational arbitration of these disputes.123 
A single arbitral tribunal to settle foreign investment disputes 
arising anywhere in the world seems neither sufficient nor feasible. 
Its permanent administrative machinery and procedure would 
need to be so all-encompassing as to be virtually unmanageable, 
if it were to be representative of all capital-exporting and newly 
developing nations and sufficiently large to handle the expected 
volume of business. Its functioning would be neither economical 
nor efficient. Moreover, sensitively sovereign nations, it is sub-
mitted, would not be content with a single tribunal which was 
necessarily both psychologically and physically distant from the 
problems of most of those nations; and indeed, capital-exporting 
nations and foreign investors would be disquieted. For this rea-
son, the writer suggests a series of regional arbitral tribunals, with 
123 See Snyder, Foreign Investment Protection: Is Institutional Arbitration an Answer?, 
40 N.C.L. R.Ev. 665, 670-72, 685-89 (1962); Snyder, Foreign Investment Protection: A 
Proposed Arbitration Convention, 11 J. Pun. L. 191, 194-95 (1962). 
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perhaps a Supreme Appellate Arbitral Tribunal. Individuals-
that is, investors, whether business entities or persons-should 
have direct access to these regional tribunals (access to the appel-
late tribunal will be covered later);124 their claims should not have 
to be espoused by their governments. Each regional tribunal 
should be staffed by a permanent secretariat composed entirely of 
nationals of the countries of the region. This should aid in giving 
these nations the feeling that their disputes are being administered 
by those who best know their problems and aspirations. The 
tribunals should be ad hoc-not permanent-ones. This, it is 
submitted, would have at least four advantages: (1) it would pre-
sumably be less expensive; (2) it would give disputants an oppor-
tunity to have some voice in selecting those arbitrating their dis-
putes; (3) it would avoid the possibility of "freezing" in office 
arbitrators who may prove ultimately to be not particularly well 
fitted (temperamentally, professionally, or otherwise) for their du-
ties; and (4) it would permit nations to have impartial, transna-
tional arbitration while yielding relatively little sovereignty. There 
should be three arbitrators on each ad hoc tribunal. Each of the 
two disputants may choose one arbitrator. These two arbitrators 
then would select the presiding arbitrator. (If there is more than 
one disputant on each side of the dispute, then all disputants on 
one side together select one arbitrator; in no case will there be 
more than three arbitrators.) There must, of course, be provision 
for appointment of these arbitrators if a disputant fails to appoint 
his arbitrator or if the two arbitrators selected fail to agree on the 
presiding arbitrator. Otherwise the arbitration procedure would 
become a mockery should a disputant seek to make it so.126 Selec-
tion of these arbitrators should not be confined to a preconstituted 
panel. There are, it is submitted, at least two reasons for this: 
(1) this-like utilization of ad hoc rather than permanent tribu-
nals-would tend to require less relinquishment of sovereignty 
( or at least it would have the appearance of less relinquishment 
of sovereignty); (2) if there were a preconstituted panel from 
which a disputant had to select an arbitrator, a disputant from 
outside the region would normally have to choose an arbitrator 
from a country within the region. (Experience indicates that ar-
bitrators selected for the preconstituted panel would have to come 
from within the region; pragmatically, another system might pose 
124 See text infra at 1123. 
125 See Snyder, Foreign Investment Protection: A Proposed Arbitration Convention, 
11 J. PUB. L. 191, 202-05 (1962). 
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too many difficulties.) In most cases, this would be unacceptable 
to the disputant from outside the region. 
Delineation of geographical areas to be served by regional tri-
bunals poses some difficulties. The writer believes, where possible, 
that geographic and ethnic lines should be followed. On this 
basis, seven regions are suggested: (I) Turkey, Iran, Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, United Arab Republic, Iraq, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia; (2) the remainder of Africa; (3) Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Viet-
nam, Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan; (4) Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Australasia; (5) Europe, Greece, Ireland, 
Israel; (6) Latin America; (7) the North American continent.126 
Reflection and further study-indeed, perhaps tentative test-
ing-may lead to the conclusion that these proposed regions are 
not workable. If so, then others should be constituted. The im-
portant points should be: (I) to follow geographic and ethnic 
lines where feasible in order to form reasonably compatible groups 
of states; (2) to form groups of states having a modicum of eco-
nomic, political and cultural ties; and (3) to give a component 
state a feeling of basic confidence in the fairness with which its 
disputes will be approached. The writer eschews inflexibility in 
this approach. Rather, this approach-along with criticisms of 
it-should be carefully weighed, so that a widely acceptable, prac-
ticable solution may be found. Above all, to paraphrase Lord 
Keynes in another context: when a doctrinaire proceeds to action, 
so to speak, forget the doctrine; for if he tries to follow doctrine 
literally he will not accomplish action. 
A thoughtful alternate proposal for resolving investment dis-
putes (having the virtue of being less elaborate and expensive than 
the writer's, in all probability) has been suggested by one of the 
writer's colleagues working this area. He suggests: 
"[O]ne international tribunal at the top, ... and a num-
ber of regional, institutionalized reference panels. When a 
dispute arose, it would be addressed to the full tribunal. But 
the tribunal could then refer it for findings of fact to a panel 
composed of referees from each region involved in the dis-
126 A vexing problem is that of determining what is to be done in case of "regional 
crossovers" or "where more than one regional body might reasonably have jurisdiction." 
This is provided for in article 2(l)(b) of the draft convention (Snyder, supra note 125, 
at 202). Succinctly, it provides that venue will be laid in the region of the respondent. 
If there is more than one claimant or respondent, venue will be laid in the region 
of the "first respondent to receive a notice against which (or whom) a claimant asserts 
a claim." Thus, when there is more than one respondent, a claimant has some choice 
as to where he will bring his arbitral action. 
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pute. The regional referees would not render an opm10n, 
but would together develop and document (as 'friends of the 
court') the facts of the dispute as they found them. Docu-
mented dissents on the facts could issue where desired . . . 
[and] a great deal of the decision would have already been 
rendered by the time the facts were decided. But the con-
trolling decision (on the basis of these facts) would come from 
a single arbitral board."127 
Careful consideration should be given to this suggestion. It may 
well point toward a more economical, less cumbersome solution 
than the writer's. 
Because the need in this area, in the writer's view, is for a 
specific, reasonably detailed proposal-there have been too many 
generalities-to serve as basis for discussion, the writer has drafted 
a model convention to establish a foreign investment arbitral tri-
bunal.128 It attempts to deal comprehensively and specifically with 
the suggested need for a workable means of transnational arbi-
tration. 
Bases for decisions by a regional arbitral tribunal are an im-
portant part of any suggestion for transnational arbitration. It 
is the writer's belief that newly developing nations are going to 
be quite hesitant about subscribing to an arbitral system which 
bases awards solely on an international law which many of them 
assert, though perhaps inaccurately, they had no part in shaping.129 
Moreover, it is unfortunately true that principles of international 
law are indistinct in some areas and non-existent in others.130 
127 G. M. Doppelt, who is vice-chairman of the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on International Trade and Investment, and was formerly chairman of that 
committee's working group on multinational conventions. The suggestion is contained 
in a letter to the writer, dated Sept. 19, 1961. 
128 Snyder, supra note 125, at 201-35. 
129 See, e.g., Anand, Role of the New Asian-African Countries in the Present Inter• 
national Legal Order, 56 AM. J- INT'L L. 383, 384-90 (1962); BRIERLY, THE I.Aw OF 
NATIONS 42 (5th ed. 1955): "The law of nations had its origin among a few kindred 
nations of western Europe." See also remarks of Dr. Jorge Castaneda, legal adviser, Per-
manent Mission of Mexico to the U.N. at American Society of International Law, New 
York Regional Meeting, March 2, 1961, pp. 11-12: "There is another interesting aspect 
to this problem .•.. Most underdeveloped countries would rather tend to feel, I think, 
that the concept of the minimum standard was created by the practice of the highly 
industrialized nations in the past in their relations with the under-developed countries, 
in situations of great inequality, especially in the last century and the beginning of 
this century." Compare Domke, Foreign Nationalization, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1961): 
"International law, far from being an outgrowth of only Western concepts, is indeed 
an expression of fundamental principles embodied in long established legal systems 
throughout the world. Islamic Law, for instance, which is of real significance for one 
sixth of the world population, in the Middle East, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and parts 
of Africa, clearly embodies the universal maxim of the protection of acquired rights." 
Id. at 585. 
130 Cf. Lauterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of Investments, in 
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These and similar reasons, then, impel the writer to suggest arbi-
tral awards based on: (I) tenets agreed upon by the disputants 
at the time the dispute is submitted to arbitration; (2) ex aequo et 
bono, in the absence of agreement; and (3) traditional interna-
tional law, if a disputant alleges breach of that law. Moreover, a 
tribunal basing an award ex aequo et bono should be guided-
although not necessarily bound-by investment and trade cus-
toms; private international law rules; and principles of justice 
recognized by the principal legal systems of the world.131 There 
is no gainsaying the difficulties inherent in basing an arbitral 
award ex aequo et bono.132 Moreover, colleagues of the writer 
believe it an improper basis for arbitral awards in investment dis-
putes.138 These views are not without force. It is the writer's 
THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, INT'L 
8: CoMP. L.Q. SUPP. PuB. No. 3, at 18, 19, 23 (1962). 
131 Compare COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE AssEMBLY Doc. No. 1419, op. cit. 
supra note 84, at 30-31. 
182 The real difficulty here is that there is no "international moral consensus" by 
which disputes not entirely legal (but rather largely a confilct between status quo and 
desire for change) can be solved by a dispute-solving tribunal. The writer realizes it 
is unrealistic to authorize such a tribunal to utilize standards ex aequo et bono if the 
standards simply do not exist. See, e.g., MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 439-40 
(3d ed. 1961). Cf. BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 129, at 292: "(A] power to decide ex 
aequo et bono is a power to abrogate or modify existing legal rights, and essentially that 
is a power to legislate. However urgent it may be to create a procedure for the orderly 
modification of international legal rights in proper cases, it is inconceivable that the 
solution will be found in the simple plan of handing over to arbitral tribunals, re-
sponsible for their decisions only to their own consciences, a function which states are 
not yet prepared to concede to an international legislature." The best answer to this 
difficult-admittedly short of a completely satisfactory one, however-is given in the 
text in the concluding sentences of the paragraph in which this footnote appears. 
138 E.g., George W. Ray, Jr., formerly general counsel, Arabian-American Oil Com-
pany, and a member of the International Bar Association's Committee on Arbitration 
Procedure for Protection of Investments Abroad, in a letter to the writer, dated Jan. 30, 
1962: "I doubt the advisability of giving the tribunal guides but no binding principles"; 
G. M. Doppelt, supra note 126:. "I do not think, however, that I would endorse the 
idea of arbitration ex aequo et bono. I agree that it would be better to have arbitration 
ex aequo ct bono than to have no arbitration at all. But, the main reason for attempt• 
ing to set forth bases upon which a substantive convention would be adopted is to 
provide the legal standards upon which the arbitrators would have to proceed. The 
legal standards should be flexible, leaving a good deal to the arbitrators"; Lord Shaw-
cross, a director of the APPi, in a letter to the writer, dated Sept. 11, 1961: "I 
think that the particular value of a tribunal of this kind (to settle foreign invest-
ment disputes] would be for it to reaffirm certain basic principles of international 
law, which a number of people in various countries are at present trying hard to 
undermine. If this process is carried any further, investors are going to be increas• 
ingly unwilling to put their capital into those countries, which are often the coun-
tries which most badly need it. Unlike you, I believe that these principles may 
often be at issue in an investment dispute and that particular emphasis should there• 
fore be given to them. • • ." Compare Prof. Dr. I. Seidl-Hohenvcldern, rapporteur, 
International Law Association Committee on Juridical Aspects of Nationalization and 
Foreign Property, in a letter to the writer, dated March 17, 1961: "I'm not at all 
shocked by the idea to give the arbitrators power to decide ex aequo et bono. As 
there seems to be quite some disagreement as to what is actually the law in respect to 
foreign investment, this seems a sensible way out. However, the choice of arbitrators 
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view, however, that his draft convention meets the criticisms in 
three ways-insofar as they can be met: (1) disputants may agree 
on bases for an arbitral award; (2) if a breach of international law 
is alleged, the question is decided on the basis of international 
law; (3) guidelines for an award based ex aequo et bono are pro-
vided. In addition, in the limited sphere of transnational invest-
ment there may be sufficient outlines of an "international moral 
consensus" to permit ex aequo et bono as one standard for dispute 
solving. 
There is a stark problem of enforcement of an award. It does 
little good-indeed, the net effect is harmful-for a disputant to 
obtain a satisfying award and then be unable to enforce it. Be-
cause there is no effective world legal order, enforcement of an 
arbitral award is immeasurably less certain than enforcement of 
a judgment in a mature, municipal juridical system. While it is 
true that the problem of enforcement has not often presented 
itself, this may be due largely to the fact that, on the one hand, 
the res out of which enforcement of the award could be made was 
available for enforcement at the time the award was made, and, 
on the other, arbitration has not been resorted to where there was 
more than inconsequential doubt about successful enforcement. 
But the plain fact is that enforcement of a transnational arbitral 
award would be, at best, tortuous and time-consuming, and, at 
worst, impossible. Moreover, acceptance of an adequate transna-
tional enforcement procedure for arbitral awards does not appear 
possible on any substantial scale in the foreseeable future. With 
this in mind, one of two approaches may be useful: first, it may 
be possible to incorporate specific enforcement provisions in a 
draft convention dealing with arbitration of investment dis-
putes.134 Second, it may be possible to incorporate the so-called 
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards135 into this draft convention.136 If all coun-
will not be made any easier by such provisions, nor, indeed, will it increase the readiness 
of States to submit such cases to arbitration at all." In a letter to the writer, dated 
Jan. 7, 1962, Seidl-Hohenveldem seemed to change his position: "As for your sugges-
tion to submit judgments ex aequo et bono, I am somewhat more hesitant. The more 
liberty you leave to the arbitrators the more difficult it will become to reach agreement 
on the then really all-decisive person of the third neutral arbitrator." 
134 E.g., Snyder, supra note 125, at 222-24 (arts. 33-36). 
135 Set out in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BROCHURE No. 60-1, INTERNA· 
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK 11-16 (1960). 
136 A caveat applies here, however; not inconsequential shortcomings in this con-
vention are enunciated in Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE 
L.J. 1049 (1961). These should be explored carefully before verbatim incorporation is 
sanctioned. 
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tries were to sign or accede to the New York Convention, arbitral 
awards would normally be enforceable without resort to either of 
these two methods. In any event, to implement transnational ar-
bitration of investment disputes effectively, it is necessary to assure 
enforcement of awards; if it were otherwise, it is not unreasonable 
to believe that no one--or virtually no one-would utilize arbitra-
tion to solve an investment dispute. 
Finally, in the writer's view, establishment of a Supreme Ap-
pellate Arbitral Tribunal would be eminently wise on three 
counts: (I) to allow correction of errors of regional arbitral tri-
bunals; (2) to help in building a well-rounded, uniform "arbitral 
jurisprudence"; and (3) as a practical matter, to provide means 
by which an unsuccessful disputant can unburden himself of pent-
up emotions following his unsuccessful quest.137 In certain enu-
merated instances, an unsuccessful disputant should be allowed 
a right of appeal. In all other instances, he should be given a. 
privilege of appeal at the discretion either of (I) the regional tri-
bunal making the original award; (2) the Supreme Appellate Ar-
bitral Tribunal; or (3) an impartial agency related in some way 
to the Supreme Appellate Arbitral Tribunal. There should be, 
moreover, a method by which a question of law might be' certified 
to the appellate tribunal by a regional arbitral tribunal. This 
procedure would be analogous to an advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, except that it would be binding. An 
acceptable system for lodging and perfecting appeals should not 
present intractable difficulty. The system of appeals used in non-
criminal cases in any mature, municipal juridical system could be 
utilized as a basis. The system finally evolved must, of course, be 
acceptable to the majority of capital-exporting and newly devel-
oping nations. Conceivably it could be modeled on the system by 
which appeal lies in non-criminal cases to the House of Lords in 
the United Kingdom, the Cour de Cassation in France, or the 
United States Supreme Court. An appellate tribunal of this sort 
is unacceptable to some of the writer's colleagues.138 These views 
deserve respect, of course; nonetheless, the writer is of the opinion 
that if there is more than one arbitral tribunal with original jur~s-
diction of foreign investment disputes, an appellate arbitral tri-
bunal is exceedingly wise-perhaps even necessary. 
137 Snyder, supra note 125, at 199. 
138 Lord Shawcross, supra note 133: "I note that you provide for an Appellate Tri-
bunal, but I fear that the existence of such a body might drag out proceedings for an 
unnecessarily long time and give rise to other complications"; Prof. Dr. I. Seidl-Hohen-
veldem, supra note 133: "[TJhe statutes of international tribunals have hardly ever pro-
vided for means of appeal. • . ." 
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Conceding agreement upon the desirability of impartial trans-
national arbitration, some would nevertheless ask how, as a prac-
tical matter, conventions to establish regional arbitral tribunals 
might be drafted. The answer is that it seems not unreason-
able to hope that the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
might suggest a meeting of states to consider drafting a convention, 
for example, in one of the regions suggested above180 where a 
considerable amount of foreign investment is being made. If a 
sufficient number of responsible governments--of both capital-
exporting and newly developing nations-and organizations rep-
resenting potential investors (for example, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the APPI or similar organizations in the 
United States and other industrially developed nations) were to 
ask, it might be possible to persuade the Secretary General to 
offer his "good offices" in selecting the site for such a meeting, 
making necessary arrangements and providing the personnel re-
quired to conduct a conference. True, this is only a possibility. But 
if nations and investors (and organizations representing them) are 
quite serious in desiring some sort of impartial transnational ar-
bitration for their investment disputes, it is a possibility worth 
exploring. 
But one should bear this in mind: the writer's suggestions, 
and, indeed, his draft model convention, 140 do not contain "final 
answers" to the complex and difficult problems encountered in 
attempting to encourage and protect private foreign investment; 
one can hope they contain "final beginnings." 
139 See text supra at 1119. 
140 Snyder, supra note 125, at 201-35. 
